Abstract. The logic S5 Ò is widely used as the logic of knowledge for ideal agents in a multi-agent system. Some extensions of S5 Ò have been proposed for expressing knowledge sharing between the agents, but no systematic exploration of the possibilities has taken place. In this paper we present a spectrum of degrees of knowledge sharing by examining and classifying axioms expressing the sharing. We present completeness results and a diagram showing the relations between some of the principal extensions of S5 ¾ and discuss their usefulness. The paper considers the case of a group of two agents of knowledge.
Introduction
The modal logic S5 Ò (see for example [18, 17] ), whose mono-modal fragment S5 was first proposed in [7] to represent knowledge, has been used to model knowledge in multi-agent systems (MAS) for some years now [4] . The logic S5 Ò is a classical modal logic containing Ò modalities £ , where is in a set of agents, expressing the private knowledge of agent . Results that extend the logic S5 Ò to model group properties such as common knowledge and distributed knowledge within a group of agents are also well known ( [4, 17] ).
The logic S5 Ò models an ideal set of agents, in particular agents enjoy positive and negative introspection and their knowledge is closed under implication; in other words they are perfect reasoners.
A peculiarity of the logic S5 Ò , is that there is no a priori relationship between the knowledge of the various agents. In some applications, however, this might not be what is desired. For example, a central processing unit of a collective map making ( [3] ) robotic MAS should be told of any knowledge acquired by any other agent. Therefore the agent should know everything that is known by any agent. In the formal language of modal logic, under the usual assumptions of ideality, this scenario can be represented by S5 Ò enriched by the axiom: £ Ô µ £ Ô, for all ¾ Another example of knowledge sharing between agents concerns a MAS whose agents (databases in this example) have computation capabilities that can be ordered. If the agents are executing the same program on the same data then it is reasonable to model the MAS by enriching the logic S5 Ò by:
where expresses the order in the computational power at disposal of the agents. In these two cases, some information is being shared among the agents of the group.
A third example of sharing in the literature is the axiom ¦ £ Ô µ £ ¦ Ô; [2] which says that: if agent considers possible that agent knows Ô then agent must know that agent considers possible that Ô is the case.
It is easy to imagine other meaningful axioms that express interactions between the agents in the system; clearly there is a spectrum of possible degrees of knowledge sharing. At one end of the spectrum is S5 Ò , with no sharing at all. At the other end, there is S5 Ò together with £ Ô¸£ Ô; for all ¾ saying that the agents have precisely the same knowledge (total sharing). The three examples mentioned above exist somewhere in the (partially ordered) spectrum between these two extremes.
Some instances of such systems have already been identified in [2, 1, 15] and in other papers. Our aim in this paper is to explore the spectrum systematically. We restrict our attention to the case of two agents (i.e. to extensions of S5 ¾ ), and explore axiom schemas of the forms
Technically we will prove correspondence properties and completeness for extensions of S5 ¾ with axioms of these forms. Naturally, this will not give the complete picture: there may be interesting axioms of other forms than those listed above. However, analysis of the literature certainly suggests that most axioms studied for this purpose are of one of these forms. They are sufficient for expressing how knowledge and facts considered possible are related to each other up to a level of nesting of two, which is already significant for human intuition. Note also that the examples above are included in the axiom patterns.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.1 we fix the notation and recall two known results that we will extensively use in the following. In Section 2 we analyse and discuss the interaction axiom schema the form Ô µ Ô. We will then move to Section 3 where we discuss the case of the consequent composed by two modal operators. In Section 4 we will analyse the interaction axioms resulting from two nested modalities both in the antecedent and in the consequent. Finally in Section 5 we present the spectrum of interaction axioms that is generated.
Preliminaries
Our syntax is the standard bi-modal language Ä, defined from a set È of propositional variables:
As standard, we use bi-modal Kripke frames ´Ï Ê ½ Ê ¾ µ and models Å ´Ï Ê ½ Ê ¾ µ ( [13] ) to interpret the language Ä. Interpretation, satisfaction and validity are defined as standard (see for example [10] ).
The paper is devoted to extensions of S5 ¾ , which is defined by the following Hilbert style axioms and inference rules.
Taut
Ë ¾ Ø, where Ø is any propositional tautology
In the above the index is in ½ ¾ .
The symbol means provability in that logic, or in the extension under consideration. By Ë ¾ · we denote the extension of Ë ¾ in which the formula is added to the axioms. The following is also widely known.
Theorem 1. The logic S5 ¾ is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames
We will always be working in the class of equivalence frames. We also recall a standard lemma that we will use in this paper. The results of Theorem 3 are quite well known. The most important logic is probably the one that forces the knowledge of an agent to be a subset of the knowledge of another. In Section 1 we have discussed two scenarios in which this can be proven useful. Stronger logics can be defined by assuming that the modal component for one of the agents collapses onto the propositional calculus. When this happens we are in a situation in which "being possible according to one agent" is equivalent to "being known" and this in turn is equivalent to "being true". It is clear that this is indeed a very strong constraint which limits the expressivity of our language. Still these logics can be proven to be consistent.
The strongest consistent logic is Triv ¾ 2 that can be defined from S5 ¾ by adding the axiom ¦ ½ Ô µ £ ¾ Ô to S5 ¾ or equivalently by adding both ¦ ½ Ô µ £ ½ Ô and ¦ ¾ Ô µ £ ¾ Ô.
In this logic the two agents have equal knowledge that is equivalent to the truth on the world of evaluation.
Interaction axioms of the form Ô µ Ô
There are 64 axioms of the shape
Factoring 1-2 symmetries reduces this number to 32. Again, many of these (14 in number) do not generate proper extensions of S5 ¾ 3 . For the remaining 18, the completeness results for the extension they generate are more complicated than the ones in the previous section. We present one result in detail (the reader is referred to [14] for the other proofs): it concerns the axiom
Triv ¾ is the logic obtained from S5 ¾ by adding £ ½ Ô¸Ô and £ ¾ Ô¸Ô. 
Proof. Soundness was proven in first part of Lemma 2.
For completeness we prove that the logic S5 ¾ · £ ½ Ô µ ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô is canonical. In order to do that, suppose, by contradiction, that the frame of the canonical model does not satisfy the relational property above. Then, it must be that there exists a point Û such that:
Therefore the canonical frame must satisfy the property above and the logic is complete with respect to equivalence frames satisfying the property
Similar results hold for the other 17 axioms of the form 2, and the situation is summarised in Fig. 2 . See [14] for full details. Among all these axioms, the most intuitive ones in terms of knowledge are probably £ ½ Ô µ £ ¾ £ ½ Ô and its "dual" £ ¾ Ô µ £ ½ £ ¾ Ô, in which one agent knows that the other knows something every time this happens to be the case. It is interesting to see that this is equivalent to one agent knowing everything known by the other agent. A more subtle, independent axiom expressed by axiom schema 2 is the formula 4 :
which reads "If agent 1 knows Ô, then he considers possible that agent 2 also knows Ô".
The above is an axiom that regulates a natural kind of "prudence" assumption of agent 1 in terms of what knowledge agent 2 may have. This is meaningful in MAS in which agents have similar characteristics. In these scenarios when an agent knows a fact, it may be appropriate to assume that the other agent, by acquiring the same information from the environment and by following her same reasoning, could have reached the same conclusion. Note that very often humans act as if they followed this axiom.
We leave it to the reader to explore other interactions from the table above.
Note that by taking the contrapositive of axiom schema 2 we can express axioms of the form Ô µ Ô. So all those axioms are also covered in this section. For simplicity we do not report the case of antecedents indexed as 2, but by applying symmetry it is straightforward to generate the corresponding axioms.
Interaction axioms of the form

Ô µ Ô
We now discuss the most complex class of axioms we will see in this paper, i.e. extensions of S5 ¾ with interaction axioms expressible as:
Of the 256 such axioms, we lose half by 1-2 symmetry; of the remaining 128, 64 of them begin with with , which, by well known S5 equivalences (Lemma 1) collapse to a case of the previous section. The remaining 64 axioms divide into 26 which do not induce proper extensions of S5 ¾ 5 and 38 axioms which do. From right to left. Suppose ¦ ½ Ô µ ¦ ¾ Ô and substitute £ ¾ Ô for Ô in it. We obtain ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô µ ¦ ¾ £ ¾ Ô, which is equivalent to ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô µ £ ¾ Ô. Now, by necessitating by £ ½ and distributing the box by using axiom K, we obtain £ ½ ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô µ £ ½ £ ¾ Ô, which, given Lemma 1 gives us to the result ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô µ £ ½ £ ¾ Ô.
Since each of the two formulas above can be proven from the other within S5 ¾ , we have that any proof of a formula in one logic can be repeated in the other. Now, since S5 ¾ · ¦ ½ Ô µ ¦ ¾ Ô is complete (see Figure 1 ) with respect to equivalence frames such that ½ ¾ , then also S5 ¾ · ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô µ £ ½ £ ¾ Ô is sound and complete with respect to the same class of frames. Axioms of shape 3 are intrinsically much harder (from a model-theoretic point of view) to examine with the basic tools than any other examined so far because they can express antecedents of the form £ ½ ¦ ¾ . These axioms represent knowledge of agent 1 about facts considered possible by agent 2. Technically, these formulas reminds us of the the McKinsey axiom of mono-modal logic, which has represented a challenging problem for logicians for many years and has been solved not too long ago by Goldblatt [5] .
Consider axiom £ ½ ¦ ¾ Ô µ ¦ ½ £ ¾ Ô. With this axiom we rule out situations in which agent 1 knows that Ô is considered possible by agent 2 and agent 1 also knows that Ô is considered possible by agent 2. We can then prove the results for this axiom. Again we can only conjecture completeness with respect to the above class of frames.
Conjecture 2. The logic S5 ¾ · £ ½ ¦ ¾ Ô µ ¦ ¾ £ ½ Ô is sound and complete with respect to equivalence frames such that either ½ Ï or ¾ Ï on every connected subframe.
Conclusions
We have identified a number of non-trivial single-axiom extensions of S5 ¾ which specify a mode of interaction between two agents, and proved correspondence, soundness and completeness with respect to the appropriate classes of frames. The main contribution of this paper lies in the identification of a spectrum of interactions above S5 ¾ . Figure 5 represents graphically all the logics discussed so far together with the corresponding semantic classes (the ones for which we only conjectured completeness are not included). In the figure, the logics are ordered strength-wise. So, the strongest logic is of course Triv ¾ (represented as S5 ¾ · ¦ ½ Ô µ £ ¾ Ô ), the weakest simply S5 ¾ . In between we have a few logic systems, the weakest of which are Catach's logic, and the two axioms that we examined in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. Note that these three logics are independent. Stronger extensions include logics in which the knowledge of an agent is included in the knowledge of the other and combination of these. 
